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An Analytical Comparison of Some Rule Learning Programs 
S 
by 
Alan Bandy. Bernard Silver and Dave Plummer 
Department of Artificial Intelligence 
University of Edinburgh 
To become a mature science. Artificial Intelligence needs more theoretical work. 
One form this should take is the analytic comparison of existing programs to extract 
precise techniques from the code, compare similar techniques. expose faults, and 
extend successful techniques. 
In this spirit, 	 we compare the 	 rule learning 	 programs of Brazdil. (21. 
Langley. [7]. Mitchell et ai. 114. 151. Shapiro. (181. and Waterman. (21). 	 Each of 
these programs has two main parts: 	 a critic for identifying faulty rules and a 
modifier for correcting them. 	 To aid comparison we describe the techniques of the 
various authors using a uniform notation. 	 We find several similarities in the 
techniques used by the various authors and uncover the relations between them. 
We compare the rule learning programs with the concept learning programs of 
Quinlan. (171. and Young et al. [23]. 	 The two types of program have much in 
common, and many of the rule modifying techniques are subsumed by the techniques 
of Young et al. 	 Quinlan's program Is able to learn disjunctive concepts that are 
more general than those that can be learned by most of the other programs. 
Keywords 
Learning, 	 concept iearning, 	 ruie 	 learning, 	 production 	 systems. 	 PROLOG. 
-. 	 Generalization. Discrimination. Version Spaces. Focussing, Classification. 
We 	 could not have 	 conducted 	 this comparison without some clarificationa 
conversations with the 	 surveyees. 	 namely: Ranan 	 Banerji. Pavel Brazdil, Pat 	 Langley. 
S 
Tom Mitchell. Gordon Plotkln, Udi Shapiro and Richard Young. 	 We thank them for 
their time and patience. 	 We also got valuable feedback from some informal 
seminars given In the Edinburgh Al department 
This 	 work 	 was supported 	 by 	 SEAC grants GR/B/29252 	 and 	 GR/C/20826. 	 and 
SERO studentships to Dave Plummer and Bernard Silver. 
1. Introduction 
Artificial Intelligence is a young science, which is still developing its methodology- 
and its terminology. 	 Currently, there is no universal agreement about many 
technical terms. 
	 Some techniques have several different nmos or none. and some 
names refer to several different techniques. 	 Some techniques have not yet been 
abstracted from the programs in which they were originally developed. The 
relationship between techniques is not well understood. 
To correct this state of affairs, it is necessary to analyse existing Al programs 
and techniques: 
- to abstract techniques from programs by explaining them in a code free 
manner: 
- to identify the range of applicability of these techniques: 
- to locate and repair flaws in these techniques: 
- to establish the relationship between techniques for the same task; and 
to extend the range of existing techniques. 
We call such research analytic comparison 
This paper is an analytical comparison of the following work in the area of Al e 
learning programs: 
- The ELM program of Brazdil. U. 21. which transforms a specification into 
a program in the domains of: simple arithmetic, algebra and letter series 
V 
3 
completion. 
• 	
- The AMBER program of Langley. (71 	 which acquires the ability to 
• 	 generate simple English utterances. 
- The LEX program of Mitchell et al. (14. 151, which acquires heuristics in 
the domain of symbolic Integration. 
- The extension by Quinian. 1171. of the concept learning system. CLS. of 
Hunt et al. (5). Qulnlan's program. lD3, was used by its author to 
classify certain chess positions as lost or won. 
- The Model Inference System of Shapiro. 1181, which synthesizes logic 
programs from examples In the domains of arithmetic, list processing. 
etc. 
- The P program of Waterman. (211. which acquires heuristics for betting in 
the game of draw poker. 
- The 	 extension 	 by Young. 	 Plotkin 	 and 	 Linz, 	 123). 	 of Winston's 	 concept 
learning program. (221, 	 which 	 learns 	 the 	 definitions 	 of simple 	 structures. 
e.g. 	 an arch. 	 from examples and near misses. 
It seemed to us that the above listed researchers had provided, sometimes 
complementary. sometimes alternative, techniques for 	 solving isomorphic 	 problems. 
but that this was obscured by their 	 use of 	 different formalisms and terminoiogy. 
Our 	 comparison is analytical in that In 	 order to 	 clarify the similarities 	 and 
differences 	 between the techniques we have described them with a uniform 	 formalism 
and terminology. 	 To keep the comparisons simple we have suppressed some of the 
details of the techniques, but we hope we have retained their spirit. 	 We have also 
suppressed all domain specific aspects of the techniques. except for the use of 
domain specific rules in our worked examples. and even here we have deliberately 
applied one person's technique to another's rules. 
a) 	 -. 
in 	 this 	 comparison, we include 	 only 	 those programs 	 that are 	 of direct relevance 
to 	 rule 	 learning, 	 and that are 	 representive 	 of key techniques. This differs from the 
4 
a 
approach of non-analytical surveys, for example that in the Handbook of Artificial 
S 
Intelligence. (4), which attempt to cover a very wide range of diverse iearning 
programs, describing each 	 in 	 the 	 terminology 	 of 	 the program's 	 author. 	 Our 
approach 	 differs from that 	 of 	 Smith 	 et 	 al. 	 (201. 	 as 	 that survey concentrated 	 on 	 the 
architecture of 	 learning programs, 	 rather than 
	 techniques. 
Furthermore, we have avoided a -behavioural classification of learning. e.g. 
	 'rote 
learning'. 	 "learning by being told'. 	 "learning from examples'. 	 "learning from 
analogy', such as that found In (4). 
	 We have tried to develop an algorithmic 
classification. 	 In our experience, programs In two different behavioural class may 
contain similar algorithms for some subtask, and there are often several different 
algorithms for each behavioural class. 
	 For instance: 	 both "learning by being told" 
and 'learning from examples' programs may use the critic procedures described in 
I. 
section 3: and the two, very different, techniques of Version Spaces . (14). and - 
Precondition Analysis. (191. can be used for learning from examples'. 
	 This makes 
the behavioural classification less than helpful to the Al researcher whose main task 
r 
is to design algorithms. 
2. The Learning Task 
The programs surveyed are usually considered to tail into one of two groups. 
The programs of Quinlan and Young at al are concept learning programs. all the 
others are rule learning programs. These two classes are in fact closely related: 
concept learning is contained within rule learning. 
2. 1. Concept Learning Programs 
A cdncept learning program has to learn a symbolic description that enables it tow 
determine whether or not an object is an Instance of the target concept. 
	 Perhaps 	 ' 
the most famous example of a concept learning program is that of Winston. (221, 
that can learn the concept of an arch. 
	 The program of Young et al. (23] is an 
extension of Winston's. 
S 
2.2. Rule Learning Programs 
S 
• 	 The task tackled by the rule learning programs is to modify a set of rules of the 
form hypothesis implies conclusion . I. e. 
H -) C 	 (I) 
These programs often use concept learning techniques to modify the hypotheses of 
such rules. 
The 	 case 	 we 	 will 	 consider first 	 is 	 that the 	 hypothesis 	 H 	 is a conjunction 
H 1 	 & 	 . . . 
	 & 	 H,1 (Ii) 
where 	 each 	 of 	 the 
	 H is 	 is 	 a 	 negated 	 or unnegated 	 atomic 	 formula. 	 We will 	 call 
such 	 rules 	 conjunctive 	 rules 	 and 	 each 	 H a 	 condition 	 of 	 the hypothesis. In 	 logic. 
conjunctive rules are called 
	 Horn Clauses 
Secondly, 	 we 	 will 	 consider 	 a 	 more general 	 class 	 of rules 	 in 	 which the 	 - 
hypothesis. H. may be made from conjunctions and disjunctions of negated or 
unnegated atomic formuiae. We will call such rules disjunctive rules . Disjunctive 
hypotheses can always be put In conjunctive normal form, as a single conjunction of 
disjunctions, or In disjunctive normal form, as a single disjunction of conjunctions. 
All the programs we consider are able to learn conjunctive rules, whereas only a 
tow can learn disjunctive rules. We will mainly be concerned with conjunctive rules. 
Disjunctive rules will be discussed in section 6. 
For each set of rules there is some target behaviour, i. e. 
	 how it should 
behave once learning is complete. 
	 The rules are modified until this target behaviour 
has been achieved. 	 - 
Some exampie rules are given in figure 2-1. 
	 In the figure. and throughout this 
paper. we adopt the PROLOG 1 convention that identifiers beginning with a capitaL 
letter denote variables, and those beginning with a lower case letter denote. 
constants. 
In the case of Brazdii and Shapiro the rules are PROLOG clauses, which are run 
in backwards chaining mode by the PROLOG interpreter. 	 Consider the first rule in 
figure 2-1. 	 if the current goal unifies (matches) against 
(X5 + X6) + X2 = X3. 
the PROLOG interpreter attempts to solve the subgoals 
X5 + X6 = X4. and 
X4 + X2 = Xa. 
in the case of Langley. Mitcheil at al. and Waterman the rules are production 
rules, which are run in forwards chaining mode. 
	
Consider the second rule in figure 
2'-1. 	 If the relations 
doscribe(X) & object(X.Y) & definito(X) & singular(X) 
hold for the current state, the production system asserts 
prefix(X. a). 
This 	 can be 	 interpreted as AMBER saying 	 a. 	 before 	 X. 	 where 	 X 	 is 	 the 	 Indefinite. 
singular. object of some event V. 
2.3. Types of Fault 
For our purposes it is necessary that the rules have a truth value. 	 It will be - 
convenient to consider the rules as being formulae of Predicate Calculus, with a 
truth value assigned by a standard model using Tarskian semantics. 
description of PROLOG can be found in Clocksin and MoDish, [3]. 
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A rule. subsi, for addition in Peano arithmetic, from 	 Brazdli, 
121 
X5 + X6 = X4 & X4 + X2 = X3 -> (X5 + X6) + X2 = X3 
whose procedure interpretation is: 
To add three numbers, add the first two and then add the result to the 
third. 
A rule for language generation, from Langley. (71. 
describe(X) & object(X, Y) & deflnite(X) & singular(X) 
-> prefix(X.a) 
which can be paraphrased as: 
if you want to describe X and X is the object of V and X Is not definite 
and X is singular then prefix X with "a". 
Figure 2-1: 	 Some Example Rules 
The rules are modified because they contain a fault. 	 These faults can be of two 
types: 
- Factual faults : A rule Is false, i.e. the rules constitute a program which 
calculates incorrect answers. 
- Control faults : The rules are true, but have undesirable control behaviour 
when run as a program, e. g. they do not terminate. 
A rule which Is overly general will either be false In the standard model, in 
which case it has a factual fault, or It will be true, in which case it has a control 
fault 
We assume throughout that the rules can be modified Into a consistent set that 
successfully accounts for all the data. 	 In particular. we will not discuss how the 
programs deal with data that is noisy. or inconsistent for some other reason. 	 Some 
of the authors do discuss this, see Mitchell's 1111 for example. 
E] 
2.3. 1. Factual faults 
An example of a factual fault is 
describe(X) & objGct(X. Y) & plural(X) -) preflx(X. a). 
This rule can be paraphrased as 
If you want to describe X and X Is the object of V and X is plural, then 
prefix X with a. 
The rule is incorrect, plural objects should not be prefixed with a. this constitutes 
a factual fault. 
2.3.2. Control faults 
As an example of a control fault, consider the following rule, modified from 
Brardil. 
XI + X2 = X3 -> Xl + X2 = X3 
This Is factually correct, but If used in its current form is likely to cause a loop. 
However, if weakened to the rule: 
X5 + XC = X4 & X4 + X2 = X3 -, (X5 + XC) + X2 = xa 
it will not cause a loop, and defines a useful procedure for specifying the order in 
which addition Is to be evaluated. The weakening Is effected by instantiating Xl to 
(X5 + XC) and replacing (X5 + X6) + X2 = X3 by X5 + XC = X4 & X4 + X2 = X3. 
It is a common device In rule based programming to impose control on a 
program by weakening a rule by Instantiation or by giving It a stronger hypothesIs. 
Such weakening can also turn a factual incorrect rule into a correct rule. 	 This is - 
why the same learning techniques are often applicable to both factual and control 
faults. 
2.4. The Main Càntroi Loop 
The faults in Langley and Shapiro's rules were factual and those in Mitchell at 
• 	 al's rules were control faults . 	 Waterman and Brazdll considered both types of 
fault. 
The programs listed, except for Quinlan's and Young's, above all used the 
following main control loop. 
Until the rules are satisfactory: 
1. Identify a fault with a rules 
2. Modify the rule to remove the fault. 
Note that the modification of the rule should not introduce new faults! 
Some of the 	 authors 	 also tackled the problem of 	 creating 	 new 	 rules, as opposed 
to modifying existing 	 ones. This 	 is discussed 	 in section 	 5. 
Following 	 Smith at 	 ai. (20], 	 we will 	 call 	 the subprogram 	 responsible for identifying 
faults 	 the 	 critic 	 . We will 	 call 	 the 	 subprogram 	 responsible 	 for 	 modifying the 	 rules 
the 	 modifier 	 . 	 in the next 	 section 	 we 	 consider 	 the 	 criticism 	 techniques used 	 by 
each of the above researchers and In the following section we consider the 
modification techniques. 
3. Criticism Techniques for Credit/Blame Assignment 
All the programs we are comparing identify faults by running the existing rules on 
a problem and then analysing the resulting rule trace . The analysis must identify 
where the rules behaved correctly. called positive training instances by Mitchell et 
al. and where they behaved Incorrectly, called negative training instances . 	 Both 
sorts of information can be used: 	 the positive instances to generalize the rules and 
the negative instances to correct them. 
10 
Negative instances can be of two types. 
- Errors of commission 	 A rule fired incorrectly, because it was 
insufficiently constrained. 	 This may produce a factual fault, because the 	 - 
rule produces an incorrect result, 	 or It could lead to undesirable 
behaviour. I. e. a control fault. 
- Errors of omission 	 A rule failed to fire, either because it was 
incorrectly constrained, or the required rule simply does not exist. 	 In 
the first case the error could be due to either a factual or control fault. 
The modifier requires three pieces of Information on each instance. 
- The type of instance: posltive. negative-commission or negative-omission. 
- The rule. 
- The context, consisting of the variable bindings when the rule was fired. 
Following Brazdil, we will adopt the convention that the variable bindings of positive 
Instances are called the selection context and the variables bindings of negative 
instances are called the rejection context 
One of the purposes of a critic is to solve the credit assignment problem 
This term was coined by Minsky. (101. to describe the problem of deciding which 
rules are responsible for certain aspects of the program's behaviour, desirable and 
otherwise. 
In the following section we describe some criticism techniques for Identifying 
control faults and factual faults 
3. 1. Using Ideal Traces 
One very common critic 	 technique, in the programs we compared. is 	 the use 	 of 
an 	 ideal trace 	 . 	 i.e. an 	 account of what rules 	 shou!d have 	 fired and in 	 what 
sequence. This technique is 	 appropriate for 	 finding 	 both control 	 and 	 factual 	 faults. 
and 	 is 	 the only technique used 	 by 	 the above 	 programs to 	 find 	 control 	 faults 
Some of the programs take the ideal trace as input, others work it out by analysis 
11 
• 	 using problem solving and Inference techniques. 	 The detailed study of those 
techniques lies outside the scope of this paper. but we describe Mitcheii et al's 
technique in the next section to illustrate the general idea. 
The Ideal trace Is compared with the actual trace of the rules, the rule trace 
to locate the first point at which the traces differ. 	 This enables the faulty rules to 
be identified. 
Running the rules 	 causes a search tree to be grown (see 	 figure 	 3-1). 	 The 	 rule 
trace 	 is 	 a 	 path through 	 this tree. 	 if this trace 	 differs from 	 the 	 ideal 	 trace 	 it 	 is 
because. 	 at 	 some 	 point, 	 the ruie 	 that fired in 	 the 	 rule trace. 	 Rr• 	 differs 	 from 	 the 
rules 	 that 	 fired In 	 the 	 ideal trace. 	 R,. Rr exhibits 	 an error 	 of 	 commission 	
and 	 A. 
exhibits an error of omission. 
The question then arises of whether the current set of rules contains A 1 . 	 If not. 
it must be created using the techniques described in section 5. 	 in this section. we 
deal with the case where A. is in the current rule set. 
Correcting 	 the error 	 of commission 	 will 	 (eventually) correct the 	 error of omission. 
When 	 the error of 	 commission is 	 corrected. 	 A,. 	 no longer 	 fires. 	 if 	 another 	 rule. 
R'r• 	 now causes an 	 error 	 of commission, 	 this 	 will be 	 corrected. 	 Eventually. 	 A 1 
must 	 be the 	 most preferred rule, 	 correcting 	 the error 	 of 	 omission. 	 We 	 are 
therefore free 	 to concentrate on errors of commission 
rule 	 Ideal 
trace 	 trace 
Figure 3-1: 	 Search Tree for Program's Rules 
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The technique can be summarised as follows: 
	 - 
(a) Grow the rule trace by running the rules on a problem. 
	 - 
(b) Compare with the ideal trace and find the first place at which they 
differ. 
(c) The rules which fired before this point, together with their associated 
selection contexts, are positive training Instances 
(d) The program rule which fired at this point. •together with its associated 
rejection context . Is a commission error. 
For Instance, suppose the rule 
subs: Xl = X4 & X4 + X2 = X3 -) Xl + X2 = X3 
fires In the context (3/X1. 21X2. Ans/X3) but that the rule 
subz: X2=X4&X1 +X4=X3-> Xl +X2=X3 
	 - 
Is fired In the ideal trace, then subs in the context (3/X1. 2/X2. AnsfXS). is an 
error of commission. 
3.2. Constructing the Ideal Trace 
Both Brazdil and Mitchell et al use their programs to produce the ideal trace 
but the approaches differ In an important way. 
In Brazdil's program. the ideal trace is constructed by a subprogram that is 
essentially separate 	 from the 	 rest. 	 it 	 uses 	 only correct 	 rules, 	 and 	 applies 	 them 
only 	 when appropriate. it 	 exhibits 	 the 	 behaviour that 	 the learning 	 component 	 is 
aiming 	 towards. The 	 learning 	 component 	 has 	 no access 	 this 	 subprogram. 	 The 
learning 	 process 	 would be 	 the 	 same 	 if 	 the 	 user supplied the 	 trace. 	 Brazdil's 	 - 
subprogram essentially 	 corresponds to 	 the 	 target 	 rules. 	 The assumption 	 that such 	 a 
subprogram exists 	 will rarely 	 be 	 appropriate. Brazdli's 'solution' 	 should 	 be 
considered to be ad hoc scaffolding 	 which 	 enables the rest of the program to run. 
13 
MItchell et al's program constructs its ideal trace by pruning the rule trace. 	 We 
will call this technique Solution Extraction . 	 The basic idea is to find a desirable 
branch 	 of 	 the program's search 	 tree, and prune 	 away 	 all 	 other 	 branches. In 	 the 
simplest 	 case the 	 desirable branch will be 	 any 	 branch 	 leading 	 to 	 a solution. 
Mitchell 	 et 	 al go 	 further and 	 try 	 to find 	 a least 	 cost 	 solution. 	 Solution Extraction 
does not assume access to 	 the 	 target rules. 
The 	 rules 	 used 	 by 	 the 	 program 	 are 	 only 	 partially 	 specified 	 (see section 4. 3) . A 
numerical 	 score 	 is 	 assigned 	 to 	 how well 	 they 	 apply 	 in 	 a 	 situation and 	 this score is 
used 	 as 	 the 	 evaluation 	 function 	 in 	 a heuristic 	 search. 	 A 	 resource limit 	 is given to 
the problem solver,which puts an upper bound on the amount of c.p.u. 	 time and 
memory it may use in attempting to solve a problem. 	 These limitations may prevent 
the program finding the least cost solution and so load to an erroneous ideal trace 
To mitigate this a further expansion is made of negative training instances 
before they are finally sent to the rule modifier . 	 This still doesn't guarantee that 
the least cost solution has been found. 
3.3. Contradiction Bacictracing 
In this section we consider Shapiro's technique. for locating factual faults . This 
technique is called Contradiction Backtracing . It is not suitable for finding control 
faults 
Suppose that the current 	 rule 	 set implies 	 P. 	 but 	 that 	 P 	 is 	 known to 	 be 	 false. 
The 	 falsity 	 of 	 P may be 	 given 	 by 	 the program 	 user or 	 calculated 	 from the 	 standard 
model. 	 Clearly, at least 	 one 	 of 	 the current 	 rules is 	 factually 	 faulty, but we 	 may 
not 	 be 	 able 	 to tell which 	 one 	 from the 	 model. If 	 the 	 faulty 	 rule contains 	 free 
variables and the model has an infinite domain then an infinite series of instances 
must be considered. 	 Contradiction Backtracing uses the rule trace and the 
2Thls Is another instance of the credit assignment problem 
14 
application of the model to variable free rules, to Identify the faulty rule. 	 Since the 
model Is only used to test a finite number of variable free rules. Contradiction 
E3acktraclng always terminates. 	 - 
Firstly 	 P Is added to the set of rules. 	 As P was ImplIed by the original rule 
set, 	 the 	 new rule 	 set 	 Is 	 Inconsistent. The empty 	 clause can 	 therefore be 	 derived 
by 	 resolution. Once 	 this 	 derivation has 	 been 	 obtained. Contradiction Backtraclng 
uses 	 it 	 In 	 reverse. 	 Starting 	 from 	 the empty clause, 	 the process makes use 	 of 	 the 
model (see below) to discover which parent of each resolution step is false. 
Eventually, the false parent must be a rule, and this rule therefore has a factual 
fault. 
The technique can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Add P as a new rule. (The rules are now inconsistent. 
(b) Derive —>, the empty clause, from the rules by resolution. 	 (The 
derivation Is a rule trace, but unlike previous techniques we will not 
need an ideal trace. 
(c) Set —> to be the current clause of the derivation and 0 to be the 
accumulated substitution. 
(d) Until the current clause is a rule, do the following: 
(I) The 	 current 	 clause was 	 derived 	 by resolving 	 clauses. 	 C and 	 D. 
with 	 unifier 	 tt, . The 	 proposition K. 	 from 	 C. 	 and negated 
proposition 	 L. 	 from D. 	 were 	 resolved away. 	 where 	 K Ut. 
Apply the 	 accumulated 	 substitution 	 to K'Z 	 to form 	 Q. 
(II) If Q contaIns any free variables then Instantiate it to a varIable 
free proposition. Q'. In any way, using the substitution e. 
(lii) Form a new accumulated substitution by combining It with 	 and 
a 
means 'Is syntactically Identical to'. 
15 
(lv) It Q' is true then let D be the current clause. 
- 	
(v) Otherwise Q' is false. Let C be the current clause. 
(e) The current clause Is a faulty rule, and applying the accumulated 
substitution to it gives a false instance. 
The 	 decision 	 as to 	 whether each Q' 	 is 	 true 	 or 	 false can 	 either 	 be 	 supplied by 
the 	 program 	 user or calculated from the 	 standard 	 model. Note 	 that 	 the 	 only 	 calls on 
the 	 model 	 are 	 to decide 	 the truth value 	 of 	 formulae without 	 free 	 variables (or 
quantifiers) . 	 Shapiro uses the term ground oracle to describe something (e. g. 
model or user) that can determine the truth value of such formulae. 
Note also that the instantiation of Q to 0' will not be necessary if Q Is variable 
free. Different choices of B may lead to different faulty rules, and may all be tried. 
For instance, suppose the current rule set were: 
describe(Y) & object(X.Y) -> describe(X) 
describe(X) & object(X. Y) •-> prefix(X. a) 
-> obJect(balls.event2) 
-) descrlbe(event2) 
but 	 that 	 prefix( balls. a) 	 were known to be 	 false. This might correspond to 	 the 	 child 
having 	 made the 	 utterance: "The dog chases a balls". Adding the new rule 
prefix( balls, a) -> 
we 	 can 	 derive 	 the 	 empty 	 clause with the derivation given 	 in figure 	 3-2. The 
Contradiction 	 eacictracing 	 algorithm now goes through the 	 stops tabulated 	 In table 
3-1. 	 The rule 
describe(X) & object(X. Y) -> prefix(X. a) 
has now been identified as faulty, with substitution (balls/X, event2/Y) giving a false 
Instance. 
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describe(X) & object(X,Y) -> prefix(X,a) 
descre(Y) & objec(X,Y) -> descrthe(X) 
describe(Y' ) & object(X,Y') & object(X,Y) -) prefix(X,a) 
-> object(balls,eventZ) 
deucrthe(event2) -> prefix(balls,a) 
-> descrthe(event2) 
-> refixya11s.a) 
preflx(balls,a) -) 
Figure 3-2: 	 Derivation of the Empty Clause from a Faulty Rule Set 
Current Clause - Q' Truth Value -- 
-'• - 
prefix(_balls,_a) false 	 -- 
-, 	 preflx(balls. a) descrlbe(event2) true 
descrlbe( event2) 
-> 	 prefix( balls, a) 
obJect( balls, event2) true 
descrlbe(Y') 	 & 	 object(X. 'C) 
& 	 obJect(X. '1) 	 -, 	 prefix(X. a) 
descrlbe(balls) true 
describe(X) 	 & 	 object(X. Y) 
-) 	 prefix(X.a)  
Table 	 3-1: 	 Backtracing 	 Through 	 a 	 Contradiction 
3.4. Summary 
The critic procedures establish the existence of a fault in the rules and locate 
the faulty rule, the substitution that made it faulty and what type of fault it is. They 
also identify circumstances in which a rule was correctly fired. 	 They feed to the - 
modifier procedures: the type of each instance, the rule in question. the context in 
which it fired. 
The major critic technique. used by nearly all the programs compared, and 
applicable to both control and factual faults 
	 Is comparison of the actual rule firings 
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with an Ideal trace 
1. Some programs have this ideal trace directly input. 
2. some have It provided by a program which corresponds to the target 
state of the rules being learned, and 
3. some work out the Ideal trace by a process of Solution Extraction. 
(2) is just a convenient automation of (1). and neither is interesting as a learning 
technique. We considered only one example of (3) . the LEX problem solver. 
although others may be found In the literature. 
4. Modification Techniques for Conjunctive Rules 
Once a fault has been located, the faulty rule can be modified. 	 The following 
modification techniques for conjunctive rules 	 were used in the programs we 
co.m pared. 
1. Ordering the rules. e.g. specifying that 
H -) C should always be fired in preference to H' -) C' 
This technique is strictly only appropriate for control faults and was so 
used by Brazdil and Waterman. However. Langley also used it to 
suppress factual errors. 
2. Instantiating a rule, e. g. transforming 
H(X,Y) -> C(XY) 	 to 	 l-l(X.X) -> C(X,X) 
This technique is appropriate for both factual and control faults and was 
used by Brazdil and Shapiro. 
3. Adding extra conditions to a rule's hypothesis. e.g. 	 transforming 
H ->C 	 to 	 H&H'->C 
This technique is appropriate to both factual and control faults, and was 
used by Brazdil. Langley. Shapiro and Waterman. 
4. Updating a rule's hypothesis to take account of now instances. e. g. 
transforming 
S 
IFI 
to 
where H' is derived from H by concept learning . 	 This technique is 	 - 
appropriate to both factual and control faults. 	 and was used by 
Waterman and Mitchell et al. 
Methods 2 and 3 both make the modified rule more specific. 	 Method 4 narrows the 
range of uncertainty about the rule. 
The techniques described above modify conjunctive rules . 	 The techniques of 
Mitchell and Langley have a limited capacity to learn disjunctive concepts. which is 
dependent on a 	 favourable 	 training 	 order. Of the programs compared in this 	 paper. 
only 	 Quinlan's program 	 learns 	 disjunctive concepts flawlessly. Modification techniques 
for disjunctive rules are described in section 6. 
4. 1. Ordering the Rules 
All rule based systems need a control strategy to decide conflicts between two or 
more applicable rules. 	 If a system uses a priority ordering on the rules then 
control faults can often be corrected by re—ordering the rules. 	 In this section we 
explain the ordering technique used by l3razdil. 
Brazdil's 	 system 	 started with an 	 unordered set of rules, and 	 imposed the 	 partial 
order 	 required 	 to 	 keep 	 the rule trace 	 in 	 line with the ideal trace 	 . 	 His critic 	 and 
modifier worked as co—routines, discovering conflicts and resolving them by imposing 
an order. 	 The technique can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Suppose that rules. P.. .... P. are applicable and that rule P 1 is fired 
in the ideal trace. 	 In the following P > Q means that the system will 
fire P before Q. 
(b) If P > P 1 for i Ir j € 11 .....n) than create a new rule P' 1 from P 1 . by 
techniques to be described in subsequent sections. and impose the order 
P' 1 > P 1 for all j. such that i 1j c(i .....n). 
(c) Otherwise impose the order P 1 > P for all j. such that i 	 j € 
(1 .... .n) 
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- 	 For instance. suppoèe the rules: 
subs: 	 Xl =X4&X4+ X2X3 - 	 Xl +X2 = X3 
subz: 	 X2=X4&X1+X4X3 - 	 X1+X2=X3 
eq: 	 -> Xl = Xl 
are all applicable, but that the Ideal trace records that subz should fire, then the 
orders 
subz > subs 	 and 	 subz 	 eq 
will be Imposed. 
if at some later stage the same rules are In conflict, but the Ideal trace 	 records 
that subs 	 should 	 tire, 	 then we cannot impose the 	 order éubs 	 > subz because 	 this 
• would contradict the existing order subz > subs. 	 In this case a new rule. subsi. is 
built from subs and the orders 
- 	 . 	 subsi > subz and 	 subsi ) eq 
- 	
are imposed. Since > is transitive these new orders also imply that subsl > subs. 
The techniques for making subsl are described in the next two sections. 
Langley uses rule re-ordering to deal with factual faults . 	 Rules are ordered by 
having an associated priority number. 	 Faulty rules have their priority reduced so 
that they are less likely to fire In future. 	 Consequently, the same fault may be 
redetected several times before the rule's priority drops so low that It is never 
selected. 	 in [7]. Langley justifies this strange technique with a rather dubious 
psychological argument. 	 in a personal communication, however, he points out that 
the technique allows AMBER to learn disjunctive concepts, see section 6.4. and to 
learn from noisy data. 
in certain situations Waterman's program is unable to modify the existing rules 
successfuily. in this case the program obtains the correct rule from the trainer. 
The program then has to assign a priority to the rule to ensure It fires only when 
needed. Waterman does not report .how his program deals with the problem of 
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conflicting priority. 	 Perhaps to try to avoid the problem. this technique is only used 
as a last resort. 	 - 
Of those rule ordering techniques. Brazdll's seems the neatest. 	 He explicitly 
records 	 the 	 partial 	 order
. 
 which Is 	 forced by 	 the critic 	 Information. 	 No 	 unnecessary 
orderings 	 are 	 imposed, as 	 with the 	 total orders of Langley and Waterman. 	 Hence. 
maximum use Is made of ordering, and there Is no unforced use of alternative 
modification techniques. 
4.2. Adding Extra Conditions to a Rule's Hypothesis 
in this section we will consider how a rule can be modified by adding an extra 
condition to its hypothesis. 
- 	 Suppose a rule. H -) C. has given a commission error, but that this rule has 
been applied' correctly in the past. 
	 The variable bindings of the correct application 
will give us a selection context and the variable bindings of the incorrect application 
will give us a rejection context . The idea of this technique is to find some 
difference between the selection and rejection contexts and use this difference as the 
new condition. The technique is realised in what, following Langley, we will call 
Discrimination 
(a) Apply the selection and rejection context substitutions to a fixed set of 
lilerals. 4 called the description space 
(b) Find a literal. H', which is true in the selection context and false in the 
rejection context. H' is called a discriminating literal 
(c) Form the new rule H & H' -, C. 
The new rule is only applicable to the selection context . 
For instanco, suppose the rule 
literal Is either a proposition, e.g. F(X), or a negated proposition, e.g. 'P(X). 
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describe(X) & object(X.Y) -> prefix(X.a) 
has been correctly applied to the word 'bail' and incorrectly applied to the word 
'balls'. 	 We have: 
Selection Context: (bail/X. eventi /Y) 
Rejection Context: (balisfX. event2/Y) 
To find the difference. Et'. between these contexts we apply them as substitutions to 
the literals in the description space 
singuiar(X) 	 "singular(X), deflnite(X). 	 definite(X) 
The only discriminating literal is singular(X) . 	 Adding this to the rule as a new 
condition yields: 
descrlbe(X) & object(X.Y) & singular(X) -, preflx(X.a) 
In section 4.2.2 we will describe a special case of Discrimination, and In section 
4-3 we will generalize Discrimination to a more powerful technique. 
4.2.1. Far Misses 
in 	 the 	 example 	 above, this 	 particular combination 	 of 	 selection context . 	 rejection 
context 	 and 	 description 	 space 	 yields only 	 one 	 discriminating literal. Following 
Winston 	 we 	 call 	 such 	 a situation 	 a 	 near 	 miss 	 . 	 If 	 there is 	 more than 	 one 
discriminating literal then we will call the situation a far miss . 	 A far miss would 
arise if we added to the description space the literal. past(Y) . meaning event V 
happened 1n the past. if past(eventl) was true but past(event2). was false then 
past(V) would also be a discriminating literal for the above contexts, and there 
would be a choice of new rules to form. Clearly the description space is of pivotal 
importance in determining whether a discriminating literal is found and what sort of 
new rUles are formed. in all the programs considered here the description space is 
user supplied, and It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. 
Waterman deals with far misses by demanding extra information from the user 
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which will settle the ambiguity (see section 4.3) 
Langley deals with far misses by creating a now rule for each discriminating - 
4 	 literal, e.g  
descrlbe(X) & objoct(X. Y) & slngular(X) -> prefix(X. a) 
describe(X) & object(X. Y) & past(Y) -) prefix(X. a) 
Any useless creations (like the past rule) would eventually be criticised as faulty and 
fall low in the priority ordering. 
Brazdil deals with tar misses by including all the discriminating literals In a 
disjunction. e. g. 
describe(X) & object(X.Y) & (singular(X) v past(Y)) 
-) prefix(X. a) 
He uses a modified version of Discrimination which trios to prune such 
disjunctions before adding new conditions. For instance. if the following contexts 
arise: 
Selection Context: (ballfX. eventi Pt') 
Rejection Context: (bails/X, ovent3/Y) 
where past(events) is true then Brazdii's Discrimination algorithm drops past(Y) from 
the disjunction to form the rule: 
describe(X) & object(X. Y) & slnguiar(X) -) profix(X. a) 
In section 6.4 we discuss how the Langley and Brazdil far miss techniques can 
be used to learn disjunctive concepts. 
4.2.2. Instantiating a Rule 
An alternative to adding an extra condition to a rule Is to Instantiate it. This Is 
really a special case of adding an extra condition, but can lead to more efficient 
rules since the extra condition Is handled by the pattern matcher. For instance. 
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suppose we are modifying the rule: 
subs: Xl =X4&X4+ X2=X3 -) Xl +X2X3 
in the contexts 
Selection Context: 	 ((3+1) IX1. 1 /X2) 
Rejection Context: 	 (3/X1. 2/X2) 
and the description space contains xl 	 = X5 + X6. 	 Xl 	 = X5 + 	 X6 	 is 	 a 	 discriminating 
literal 	 . so 	 we could add 	 it 	 as 	 an extra condition 	 . Alternatively. 	 we 	 could 
instantiate the rule with the substitution. ((X5+X6) / Xl) to form 
subsi: X5 + X6 = X4 &X4 + X2 = X3 	 -> 	 (X5 +X6)+ X2 = X3 
Instantiation with 	 the substitution 	 (tIX) is 	 always 	 an 	 alternative 	 when 	 the 	 discriminating 
literal 	 is 	 X = 	 t. 	 for some variable X and term t. 
4.3. Concept Learning of the Rule Hypothesis 
in this section we consider how a rule can 	 be modified by 	 updating 	 its 	 hypothesis 
using 	 concept 	 learning 	 techniques, 	 like those 	 used 	 by Winston. 	 (221. 	 for 	 learning 	 the 
concept 	 of an 	 arch 	 from 	 examples and 	 near 	 misses. This 	 technique 	 can 	 be 
regarded 	 as a 	 natural 	 extension 	 of the 	 one 	 described 	 in the 	 last 	 section. 	 This 
relationship is 	 most 	 clearly 	 seen 	 by considering 	 the 	 technique 	 of 	 Young 	 et 	 al. 
because 	 it generalises 	 much 	 of the 	 Winston 	 and Brazdil/Langley/Waterman 
techniques. and 	 is 	 similar 	 to. 	 but more 	 easily 	 explained than, 	 the 	 Mitchell 	 et 	 ai 
technique. 
We therefore adopt the strategy of explaining first the Young et al technique. 
pointing out the differences from the other techniques as we go. 	 We will be 
defining an algorithm which we will call Focussing . 	 We describe Quinlan's 
technique. Classification . for learning disjunctive concepts in sections 6.5 and 6.6. 
and compare Classification with Focussing in section 6. 7. 
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4. 3. 1. The Description Space 
The description space . in Focussing. tries to capture the notion of a partially - 
specified concept, in which some situtations are know to lie outside the concept. 
some inside, and some, in a grey area, are yet to be decided. The Focussing 
process works to reduce this grey area. 
The description space consists of a set of relation trees (see figure 4-1). 	 Each 
node of the tree Is labelled with a relation; relations in the same tree being applied 
to the same arguments. 	 The label of the root node is the relation which is always 
true. 	 The label of a node is logically equivalent to the exclusive disjunction of the 
labels of its daughters. I. e. 	 the arrangement 
p(X) 
q(X) 	 r(X) 	 s(X) 
implfes that 
p(X) c-> (q(X) ' r(X) 	 s(X)) 
where 	 v 	 means exclusive 	 or. Thus, 	 any 	 given 	 instance will 	 cause 	 the 	 relation 
labelling 	 exactly one 	 tip 	 node to 	 be 	 true. 	 The 	 instance is 	 said 	 to 	 specify 	 this 
relation. 
These trees make explicit the relationship between a proposition and its negation 
by arranging them as the labels on the two daughters of the root node. 	 A tree 
consisting only of a root node with two daughters will be called a minimal tree 
The singular/plural and definite/Indefinite trees of figure 4-1 are minimal. 
This description space 	 allows a 	 partially 	 specified 	 rule 	 hypothesis 	 to be 
represented. 	 During the 	 course 	 of rule 	 learning 	 this 	 partially 	 formed 	 hypothesis Is 
gradually firmed 	 up untii 	 It 	 is 	 completely 	 specified. 	 The 	 partlai 	 representation Is 
achieved by 	 placing two 	 markers 	 In each tree: 	 an upper mark and a lower mark as 
In 	 figure 4-1. 	 The partially 	 specified rule 	 Is 	 represented 	 by 	 the 	 rule 	 conclusion and 
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1. 	 true(X,Y) 
action( X, Y) 	 actor( X, Y) 
(upper) 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y) 
(lower) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
deflnite( X) 	 indefinite( X) 
(lower)  
2. 	 true(X) (upper) 
singulax(X) 	 plural( K) 
(lower) 
4. 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) 
Figure 4-1: 	 Description Space for Language Acquisition 
the description space together with Its marks. We will call this a rule shell 
Any 	 relation above 	 the 	 upper mark5 	 Is 	 outside the 	 concept. e. g. 	 actlon(X. Y) 
and 	 true(X.Y) . Any 	 relation 	 in the 	 tree 	 below the 	 lower mark 	 Is 	 inside 	 the 
concept. 	 e.g. object(X. Y) 	 Any relation 	 between the 	 upper and 	 lower marks 	 is 	 in 
a 	 grey 	 area, about 	 which 	 the program 	 is 	 not sure, 	 e. g. agent(X. Y) 	 and 
actor(X.Y). 	 The condition is firmed up when the upper and lower marks coincide. 
The rule shell Is firmed up Into a rule when each of Its conditions Is firmed up. 
Focussing works by moving the upper marks down and/or the lower marks up. until 
they coincide. 
Since the rule shell only partially specifys the rule, there is some ambiguity about 
what rule to use when formIng rule traces. In particular. we can take two extreme 
views: 
- 	
- The 	 Most General 	 View 	 : 	 that the 	 hypothesis 	 is specified by 	 the 
I 	 conjunction of 	 relations 	 labelling 	 Its upper 	 marks, 	 which leads 	 the rule 	 to 
• 	 make errors of commission 	 and. 
5Here, we say that a relation is above a mark if it is outside the subtree dominated by that mark. Similarly, a 
relation Is below a mark if it is In the subtree dominated by that mark. A relation is between the upper and 
lower marks if it is above the lower mark and below the upper mark. 
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- The Most Specific View 	 that the hypothesis is specified by the 
conjunction of relations labelling its lower marks, which leads the rule to 
make errors of omission 
For the sake of definiteness and to facilitate comparison with the last section, we - 
will adopt the most general view. 	 Note that this will force all negative training 
Instances to be errors of commission rather than errors of omission. 
	 Furthermore. 
since root reiptions are always true we will omit them from the hypothesis. 
	 Thus 
the rule represented by the description space in figure 4-1 Is 
descrlbe(X) & actor(X. Y) —> prefix(X. a) 
	 (Iii) 
rather than 
describe(X) & object(X. '1) & singular(X) & lndefinite(X) & past(Y) 
—) prefix(X.a) 
Also, for the sake of definiteness, we will assume that the rules are fired forwards. 
Neither of these restrictions Is serious, since the algorithms for the other cases are 
duals of the one described below. 
The partial representation of a rule provided by a rule shell is similar to the 
version space representation used by Mitchell et at In the Version Spaces algorithm. 
6 
They record two sets: S. the set of most specific rules Implied by the evidence so 
far; and G. the set of most general rules Implied by the evidence so far. 
For Instance, the version space corresponding to the description space In figure 
4-1. is: 
7 
 
5: (describe(X) & object(X,Y) & singular(X) & indeflnite(X) & past(Y) 
-, prefix(X,a)J 
C: (describe(X) & actor(X,Y) -) prefix(X,a)) 
6lhroughout this paper, "Version Spaces" denotes the algorithm or Mitchell at al, while "version space" 
denotes the object. 
7
Note that we have omitted the true(X) conditions as these are always true. 
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The version space representation is more compact that the description space 
representation, but the explanation of Focussing is more messy. Version spaces do 
not explicitly record a piece of information vital to Version Spaces namely the 
correspondence between the conditions in the different rules. e. g. between 
obJect(X.Y) in S and actor(X,Y) in G. 
The Brazdil/Langley/ Waterman Discrimination technique of the last section 
corresponds to moving the upper mark down from the root to a tip of a minimal 
tree . We will enrich the meaning of Discrimination to cover all cases In which 
near/far misses cause the upper mark to descend. 
The ascending 	 of lower 	 marks 	 does 	 not 	 correspond 	 to any 	 technique 	 used 	 by 
Brazdii or 	 Langley. it 	 is 	 done 	 when 	 the 	 critic 	 provides 	 a positive 	 training 	 instance 
of 	 a 	 rule 	 and 	 it 	 generalizes the 	 hypothesis, 	 of 	 that 	 rule. In 	 Winston's 	 program. 
1221, it 	 corresponds to 	 the 	 generalization 	 of 	 a 	 concept 	 when 	 new 	 examples 	 of 	 the 
concept are 	 provided. We will 	 call 	 this 	 step 	 Generalization 
Focussing does not just compare the current context with a single previous 
context, but with all previous contexts. This is possible because all previous 
contexts, both selection and rejection, are summarised by the positions of the upper 
and lower marks in the relation trees . 	 We need only compare the current context 
with the ôurrent positions of these marks. 	 if the critic has provided us with a 
positive training instance then we will have a selection context, and will apply 
Generalization. 	 if the critic has provided us with a commission error then we will 
have a rejection context . and will apply DIscrimination. To some extent 
Generalization and Discrimination are dual processes. but this duality is not complete 
and the reader should beware of assuming that It is. 
The 	 description space 	 is initialized 	 by 	 providing a 	 positive 	 training 	 instance. 	 For 
each 	 tree 	 in 	 the description space, 	 exactly 	 one 	 of its 	 tip 	 relations 	 will 	 be 	 specified 
E'A 
by (I. e. be true in) the selection context of this Instance. 	 The lower mark is 
placed on this tip'. 	 The upper mark Is placed on the root of the tree. 
We now consider Generalization and Discrimination in more detail. 
4.3.2. GeneralizatIon 
The Input to Generalization consists of: the selection context of a correct 
application of a rule: and the description space of the rule. 
	
The output consists of 
new lower marks for some of the trees. 
	 Each tree is considered in turn and the 
following steps executed. 
(a) For each of the relations labelling a tip node, determine Its truth value 
In the selection context. 
(b) Exactly one of these relations will be specified by the selection context. 
label its node, the current node 
(c) Find the least upper bound of the current node and the current lower 
mark and make this the new lower mark. 
For instance, suppose that the rule 
describe(X) -> prefix(X.a) 
has been correctly applied in the selection context 
(dogfX. eventl/V) 
and that position of the marks In the relation trees are as in figure 4-2. The tip 
relations which are true in the selection context are: 
agent( dog. eventi). 
singular(dog), 
lndefinite(dog). 
present( event 3) 
These specify the current nodes 
	 markôd in 	 figure 	 4-2. 	 and might correspond to 	 the 
child making the 	 utterance: 	 A 	 dog chases 	 the ball". Taking 	 the 	 ieast upper 
bound between each 	 current node 	 and iower mark gives 	 the new lower marks given 
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in figure 4-2. 	 Note that the lower mark for trees 2 and 3 is unchanged. but that 
the lower mark of tree 1 moves to 'actor(X. V)' and the lower mark for tree 4 
moves to 'true(Y)'. 
Despite these changes to the lower marks of the description space. the rule does 
not change form, because it is determined by the upper marks. However. 
Generalization does have an effect on the rule learning process, because the lifting 
of the lower marks can limit the choices available to Discrimination . as we will see 
in the next section. 
1. 	 true(X,Y) (upper) 
actlon(X,Y) 	 actor(X,Y) 
(new, lower) 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y). 
(current) 	 (lower) 
.3 	 true(X) (upper) 
deflnite(X) indefinite(X) 
(lower 
& current)  
2. true(X) (upper) 
slngular( X) 
	
plural(X) 
(lower 
& current) 
4. true(Y) (upper & 
/fl-RcwlOWr) 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) (current) 
Figure 4-2 	 Applying Generalization to the Description Space 
The version space corresponding to the now lower marks' of figure 4-2 Is: 
5: (descrthe(X) & actor(x,Y) & singula.r(X) & indefinite(X) 
-> prefix(X,a)) 
Cs (descrthe(X) -) preflx(X,a)J 
4. 3. 3. DIscrimination 
The input to Discrimination consists of: the rejection context of an incorrect 
application of a rule: and the description space of the rule. 	 The output consists of 
a new upper mark for exactly 211.Q of the trees. 8 	 SInce we are dealing with a 
6Note lack of duality. 
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conjunctive rule, all Its conditions must be true for the rule to fire. 	 Thus making 
one condition false for an instance is enough to prevent the rule firing. 	 Each tree 
is considered in turn and the following steps executed. 
4 
(a) For each of the relations labelling a tip node, determine its truth value 
in the rejection context. 
(b) Exactly one of these relations will be true In the-rejection context, label 
its node, the current node . Note that the curreAt node must lie below 
the upper mark . otherwise the rule could not have fired. 
(c) If the current node lies below the lower mark then mark the tree as a 
white tree  
(d) Otherwise, the current node must lie between the upper and lower 
marks. 	 Mark the tree as a grey tree 
At 	 least one 	 of 	 the 	 trees must be 	 grey, 	 otherwise 	 the 	 ruie application would 	 be 
correct. 	 If 	 just 	 one 	 tree 	 Is grey then we have a 	 near miss . 	 If 	 more than - one 
tree 	 is grey then 	 have a far miss . 	 Only one of the grey trees can have its 	 upper 
mark 	 lowered. 	 We 	 call 	 this grey tree 	 the 	 discriminant 	 . 	 Far misses can be 	 dealt 
with by at least five strategies: 
- depth first : We can pick one of the grey trees as discriminant: 
- breadth first: Or create a now rule for each grey tree: 
- teacher option: Or we can be told which tree to pick; 
- zero option: Or we can do nothing. 
- avoidance option: Or we can arrange the training order so that far 
misses do not arise. 
Either 	 of 	 the 	 first 	 two choices may lead to the 	 creation 'of 	 rules which are over 
constrained 	 and 	 may give 	 rise to errors of omission 	 . Such rules should be 
deleted. in 	 the 	 case 	 of depth 	 first search 	 the program should 	 then backup 	 and 
chose another 	 discrimlnant. The breadth 	 first option corresponds to 	 Langley's 
solution to 	 far 	 misses, 	 as described In 	 section 4. 2. 1. The 	 third 	 choice 	 is 	 that 
I 
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adopted. by Waterman, with the relevance information indicating which grey tree to 
pick (see below). 	 The fifth choice is that adopted by Winston. in fact, he made a 
feature of the dependence of his method on the training order. 
	
If there are enough 
Instances to firm up all the trees, then far misses can be avoided by presenting all 
the positive instances first. 	 However, presenting all the positive instances first can 
cause errors with some approaches to disjunctive rules (see section 6.3). 	 Brazdil's 
solution cannot be adopted here without violating the relation tree representation of 
the rule hypothesis. but It is similar to the Version Spaces solution (see below). 
Once the dlscriminant has been picked its upper mark is lowered, just enough to 
exclude the current node . This is done by setting the new upper mark to be the 
least upper bound of the current node and the lower mark . To Illustrate 
Discrimination suppose that the rule 
describeCX) -) prefix(X. a) 
has been Incorrectly applied In the rejection context 
(chases/X, event2/Y) 
and that the position of the marks in the relation trees are as in figure 4-2. The 
tip relations which are true In the rejection context are: 
action(chases. event2). 
slngular(chases). 
indeflnite(chases). 
present( event2) 
These 	 specify the current nodes 	 marked 	 In 	 figure 	 4-3. 	 and 	 might correspond 	 to the 
child 	 making 	 the utterance: 	 The dog •a 	 chases the 	 bail. 	 Trees 	 2 	 and 	 3 are 
white 	 and 	 trees 	 'I and 	 4 	 are 	 grey. If 	 tree 	 1 	 is chosen 	 as 	 the 	 discriminant then 
action(X.Y) 	 can be 	 excluded 	 by lowering 	 the upper 	 mark 	 from 	 true(X.Y) to 
actor(X. fl. 
	 The new rule is: 
9Note lack of duality with Generalization • I.e. we do not use the greatest lower bound of the upper and 
current mark. 
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descrlbe(X) & actor(.X.Y) -, preflx(X.a) 
	 (lv) 
2. 	 true(X) (upper) 
(white) 
singular(X) 	 plural( K) 
(lower 
& current) 
1. 	 true(X,Y) (upper) 
(grey) 
action( X, Y) 	 actor( X, Y) 
(current) 	 (new upper) 
agent( X, Y) 	 object( X, Y) 
(lower) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
(white) 
deflnite( X) indefinite( X) 
(lower 
& current) 
4. 	 true(Y) (upper) 
(grey) 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) (current) 
Figure 4-3: 	 Applying Discrimination to the Description Space 
4.3.4. Far Misses 
If tree 4 had been picked as the discriminant then the new rule would have 
been: 
describe(X) & past(Y) -) prefix(X.a) 
Since 	 the 	 tense of an 	 utterance does not affect whether the 	 article 	 a 	 should 	 prefix 
actors 	 then 	 this rule 	 would eventually be 	 guilty 	 of 	 an 	 error 	 of 	 omissIon, 	 e.g. 	 in 	 the 
context 	 (dog/X. event4/Y), where 	 present(event4) . 	 the rule 	 would 	 not 	 fire 	 when 	 it 
should. 	 At 	 this stage 	 the rule 	 should be 	 deleted, 	 and if 	 the 	 alternative 	 rule. 	 (iv), 
has not already been formed, then it should now. 
Note that It the Generalization of past(Y) and present(Y) to true(Y) . had 
preceded the current Discrimination step. then tree 4 would not have been a grey 
tree and. hence, not available as the discriminant. Thus Generalization can prevect 
the occurrence of far misses, and the consequent creation of erroneous rules. For 
this reason it is best to make Generalization steps before Discrimination steps. 
When Waterman's program makes a wrong decision, either a control or factual 
error, It is given information additional to that provided by the Ideal trace 
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Waterman calls this Information relevance information 	 This is a set of the trees 
that need to be considered to make a correct decision, 	 in the situation of figure 
* 	 4-3. the relevance information would Indicate that tree 1 is to be considered. and 
that tree 4 is not. 
The version space corresponding to the new upper marks of figure 4-3 is 
Si fdescribe(X) & object(X,Y) & singular(X) & 
lndeflnite(X) & pa.st(Y) 
-) prefix(X,a)J 
C: (descrthe(X) & actor(X,Y) -> prefix(X,.a), 
describe(X) & paat(Y) -> prefix(X,a)) 
Note 	 that the correspondence 	 between object(X. Y) 	 and 	 actor(X. Y) 	 is 	 not expilcitly 
recorded and must 	 be 	 rederived 	 before further 	 GeneralizationfDiscrimination can 	 be 
applied. This is a disadvantage of the version space representation. 
in 	 this version 	 space 	 G 	 is 	 a doubleton: the 	 two members 	 representing the 
outcomes of 	 the 	 twofold 	 choice 	 of discriminant in 	 the 	 far miss 	 situation. 	 Thus the 
version 	 space can 	 simuitaneousiy represent 	 several 	 alternative 	 versions of 	 a 	 ruie. 
This 	 explains why 	 G 	 is 	 a 	 set. However, 	 it 	 does 	 not 	 expiain 	 why 	 S is 	 a 	 set. 
Generalization never 	 Invoives 	 choices. 	 even 	 when 	 the 	 version 	 space 	 is representing 
several 	 rules, so 	 S 	 will 	 always 	 be a 	 singleton! 	 Aiiowing 	 S 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 set appears 	 to 
be a minor flaw in the LEX program. 10 
4.3.5. Differences between Version Spaces and Focussing 
• 	 Focussing and Version Spaces are simiiar In many ways, most importantly they 
both combine Generaiization and Discrimination . 	 However, there are a few 
- 	 differences. 
- The Focussing relation trees explicitly store the correspondences between 
10Mltcheli, (personal communication), states that while this Is the case for the rule language used in this 
paper. (end for the rule language used in LEX), with other rule languages, such as that usod In Meta-
DENDRAL. S can be a non-singleton set. 
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relations, and this must be rederived in Version Spaces. 
- As shown in section 5. 1 below, the two representations differ in the rule-
creation phase. The specific boundary of the version space represents a 
more specific concept than that represented by the lower marks in the 
Focussing algorithm. 
- 	 In 	 the 	 Focussing 	 algorithm. 	 Generalization and Discrimination affect 	 only 
one 	 set 	 of 	 marks, 	 the 	 lower 	 and 	 upper marks respectively. Version 
Spaces 	 actually 	 requires 	 the 	 updating 	 of both 	 boundary 	 sets 	 for 	 both 
processes. 	 The 	 extra 	 operations 	 prune the boundary 	 sets: patterns 
matching 	 negative 	 instances 	 are 	 removed 	 from the 	 specific 	 boundary 	 set, 
and 	 patterns 	 not 	 matching 	 positive . instances are removed from the 	 general 
set. 	 None 	 of 	 the 	 examples 	 given 	 for 	 LEX use these 	 pruning operations, 
and they seem to be needed only when dealing with 	 graph-like description 
spaces and for noisy data. 
4.4. Summary of Conjunctive Modification Techniques 
The following relationships hold between the techniques presented above: 
- Focussing combines Generalization and Discrimination in a clean manner. 
They are near duals. but Discrimination is non-deterministic, whereas 
Generalization Is not. 
- Focussing is similar to Version Spaces, except that the Focussing relation 
trees explicitly store the correspondences between relations, and ibis must 
be rederived in Version Spaces 
- The firming up of a rule shell in Focussing and the meeting of S and G 
In Version Spaces, provide guarantees that the learning process has 
terminated. No such guarantees are provided by Generalization or 
Discrimination used alone. 
- Focussing contains a generalization of Langley's Discriminatidn so that it 
can deal with non-minimal relation trees  
- Discrimination is a generalization of Brazdii's rule instantiation. 
- Rule ordering is independent of the other modification techniques. 
Discrimination on far misses introduces choice and search into the modification 
processes. 
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Two possible flaws were detected In the published research: 	 Langley's use of 
rule ordering for factual faults 	 and Mitchell et al's use of a set of most specific 
rules, 	 when there 	 can never 	 be 	 more 	 than 	 one. 	 Both authors 	 have told us 	 that 
while these are 	 flaws 	 In the 	 programs referenced 	 In this 	 paper, 	 they can be features 
In programs designed to tackle 	 more 	 difficult 	 problems. 	 e.g. cope with noisy data. 
5. Creating New Rules 
In this section we describe how new rules are created, in contrast to the 
modification of existing rules. Some of the programs don't address this task. None 
of the programs actually create new rules in the sense of deriving new conditions 
and conclusions. Instead, they use a degenerate form of rule modification, on a 
rule with no conditions. 
5. 1. Modifying the Empty Shell 
One obvious technique for creating a rule Is to treat
. 
 Its absence as an error of 
omission, and use the standard techniques to correct this error. 
The idea Is to modify rules that have no conditions from the description space, 
only a conclusion. 	 (The lack of conditions can cause both factual and control 
faults . ) We call such rules empty rules 	 An empty rule, together with its 
description space. constitute an empty shell 
	
Mitchell and Shapiro adopt this 
approach, whIch we call Modifying the Empty Shell 
In our example, 
describe(X) -> preflx(X.a) 
will 	 be an 	 empty 	 rule. The condition describe(X) 	 does 	 not 	 take 	 part 	 in 	 learning, 	 it 
is 	 not in 	 the 	 description space. , 
We describe the method used by LEX. ShapIro's method Is similar. 
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LEX creates a new rule shell when the process of Solution Extraction discovers an 
error 	 of omission the first time that a 	 new 	 rule Is used 	 In the 	 ideal trace 	
. In 
Focussing terminology, the lower marks are Initialized to the current marks, the 
- 
upper marks are InitIalized to the roots of the trees. 
If the most specific view is adopted, the rule shell Implies that the rule should 
only be used in the current context. The most general view implIes that the rule 
should always be used. 
For example, suppose that LEX is learning when it should use the empty rule 
describe(X) -> prefix(X. a). 
The ideal trace uses the rule for the first time In the context 
agent(dog, eventi). 
slngular(dog). 
indefinite( dog). 
present(eventl). 	 -I- 
(This corresponds to e. g 	 ap dog chases a ball. ) 	 LEX creates the new rule 
shell shown In figure 5-1. 
i. 
1. 	 true(X,Y) (upper) 
action(x,Y) 	 actor(X,Y) vv 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y) 
(lower) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
definite( X) 
	 indefinjte(x) 
(lower) 
Figure 5
- 1 
2. 	 true(X) (upper) 
aingular(X) 	 plural(X) 
(lower) 
4. 
/17~ 
pa.st(Y) presen€(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) 
The Initialized Rule Shell 
This corresponds to the version space 
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3: describe(dog) & agent(dog,eventl) & singular(dog) & indefinite(dog) 
-, prefix(dog,a). 
G: describe(x) -> preflx(X,a). 
Note the rule S Is more specific than that represented by the Focussing algorithm. 
The version space representation allows the representation of very specific concepts, 
these will usually be generalized by further examples. 
Note that LEX also creates new rule-shells when the concept it is trying to learn 
is disjunctive, see section 6.3. 
Shapiro adopts a similar approach, although he is dealing with factual faults. 
MIS begins with the empty program. 	 This fails to account for a positive instance. 
(an error of omission) . and so It is modified using his standard technique. 
5.2. Guided Rule Creation 
Waterman's program is given training information by the user 11 This information 
allows 	 the 	 program to 	 directly 	 construct 	 the training rule 	 . 	 the rule 	 that 	 should 	 have 
been 	 used 	 In 	 the current 	 situation. 	 The program first 	 tries to 	 modify 	 the 	 existing 
rule 	 set 	 to 	 cover the 	 training 	 rule, 	 but if 	 it 	 is unable 	 to do 	 this. 	 it 	 adds 	 the 
training 	 rule 	 to 	 its set, 	 thus 	 obtaining 	 a 	 new 	 rule. We 	 call this 	 approach 	 Guided 
Rule Creation 
The addition of the training rule can lead to control faults . 	 Waterman adopts 
the approach likely to minimize this possibility by adding the new rule Just before the 
rule 	 that fired 	 incorrectly, correcting both 	 an error of 	 commission 	 and an error 	 of 
omission. The 	 technique is 	 rather ad-hoc, and there 	 seems 	 nothing to prevent 
further instances causing the program to loop, but Waterman does not discuss this. 
11 There are several different versions of Waterman's program. In some, the role of the user Is played by an 
expert program. in another the program uses a type of database to get this information. However, for our 
purposes the distinction is unimportant. 
38 
Langley's 	 Rule Creation approach is 	 somewhat 	 similar 	 to 	 Waterman's. 	 However. 
AMBER obtains 	 Its training rule 	 from a 	 set of 	 meta-rules 	 rather than 	 the 	 user. 	 The 
distinction 	 doesn't appear to be very significant. 
5. 3. Summary 
We have described two rule creation techniques: 
- Modifying the Empty Shell 
- Guided Rule Creation. 
Both of these 	 techniques 	 are 	 strongly dependent on 	 the description 	 space 	 . 	 which 
supplies the conditions 	 of the 	 new 	 rule. 
Modifying 	 the Empty 	 Shell 	 is 	 also 	 strongly dependent on 	 the ideal trace 	 The 	 ideal 
trace 	 is 	 needed to 	 discover 	 the conclusion of 	 the 	 new rule. Of course, 	 it 	 also 
shows that an 	 error has 	 occurred, and thus indió'atos 	 the need for a new rule. 
This technique thus combines conclusions provided by the ideal trace with 
conditions from 	 the description space. apparently 	 a rather 	 trivial 	 form 	 of rule 
creation. However, it 	 would. perhaps be 	 too 	 much to 	 expect 	 the 	 program to 
somehow discover new conditions and conclusions for itself. 
Guided Rule Creation obtains the conditions and conclusions of the new rule from 
the user. This is really an uninteresting way of creating new rules, and Waterman's 
implementation may be flawed. 
6. ModIfication Techniques for Disjunctive Rules 
The techniques discussed above have all been for conjunctive rules or conjunctive 
concepts. 	 In this section we consider the • extension of these techniques to learn 
disjunctive rules and concepts. i.e. 	 concepts that involve disjunction, as well as 
conjunction and negation. 
KPI 
In one sense the extension to disjunctive concepts is trivial. 
	
Any concept 
involving conjunction, negation and disjunction can be put in disjunctive normal form. 
I.e. rewritten into a logically equivalent form consisting of a disjunction of 
conjunctions of negated or unnegated atomic formulae. Each disjunct can then be 
learned separately using conjunctive learning techniques. From the viewpoint of rule 
learning this means that any disjunctive rule can be split into a number of 
conjunctive rules, e. g. 
describe(X) & actor(X.Y) & (singular(X) v deflnite(X)J 
-> use-article(X) 
(meaning: "use an article when describing a singular or definite actor") is logically 
equivalent to: 
descrlbe(X) & actor(X) & singuiar(X) -> use-article(X) 
describe(X) & actor(X) & definite(X) -> use-article(X) 
The problem of learning disjunctive rules then becomes one of knowing when to 
spilt a rule shell Into two or more rule shells, and which positive Instances to 
associate with which shells. (Negative Instances are counterexamples to all rules 
and apply to all shells) Since the Focussing concept learning technique subsumes 
the other techniques discussed above, we will compare various techniques for dealing 
with disjunctive concepts by considering what modifications they suggest to Focussing. 
The only exception to this is Quinian's Classification, which cannot be described in 
terms of FocussIng. We discuss this In sectIons 6.5 and 6. 6. and compare It to 
Focussing in section 6. 7. 
Of the programs discussed above, only Langley's AMBER, Mitchell's LEX and 
Brazdii's ELM, attempted to deal with disjunctive concepts. 
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6. 1. How Focussing Fails on Disjunctive Rules 
What difficulties arise when Focussing is applied to a disjunctive concept? 
First note that Focussing has some limited scope for disjunction. 	 For example 
the rule 
describe(X) & actor(X. '1) -> prefix(X. a) 
effectively represents a rule containing an (exclusive) disjunction: 
describe(X) & (agent(X. Y) v object(X, 'fl) -> prefix(X. a). 
However, concepts containing disjunctions between trees cannot be represented. 	 An 
example of such a rule is: 
descrlbe(X) & actor(X,Y) & (singular(X) v definite(X)) 
-> use-article(X) 
We now consider how Focussing might be adapted to learn this rule. 	 We use 
the same description space as before. 
	 Suppose that we have the Instances given in 
figure 6-1. 
(a) 	 agent(dog,eventl), 	 (b) object(ball,event2), 
singular( dog), 	 slngular(ball), 
indefirzite( dog), 	 indefinite( ball), 
present( eventi). 	 past( eventz). 
(c) 	 agent(dogs,event3), 	 (d) object(balls,event4), 
plural(dogs), 	 plural(balls), 
indefinite( dogs), 	 definite(balls), 
present(eventa). 	 past( event4). 
(e) 	 object(ball,events), 	 (f) action( chases, event6), 
singular(ball), 	 singular( chases), 
definite( ball), 	 deflnite( chases), 
present( event5). 	 present( event6). 
Figure 6-1:" 
	
Training Instances for a Disjunctive Concept 
Instances (a). (b). (d) and (e) are positive training instances . (c) and Cl) are 
negative ones. 
	 They might correspond to the child making the utterances: 
(a) "A dog chases . . 
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(b . chased a ball" 
(c) aa 
 dogs chases . . . . 
Cd .....chased the balls" 
Ce.....chases the ball. 
Ct) ". . . . the chases 
Suppose the training order is Instance (a) . followed by instance (b) . 
	 The 
description space will now contain the marks shown in figure 6-2. 
	 Tree 4 is firmed 
S 
1. 	 true(X,Y) (upper) 
action(X,Y) 	 actor(X,Y) 
(lower) 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
definite(X) indefinite(X) 
(lower) 
2. 	 true(X) (upper) 
/ 
singular(X) 	 plural(X) 
(lower) 
4. 	 true(Y) (upper 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
Figure 6-2: 
	 The Description Space After Two Positive Instances 
Now Instance (c) is presented. 	 This is a negative Instance. so  Discrlminatlor 
occurs. 	 Only Tree 2 is grey, so It becomes the dlscrlminant and Is firmed up, 
while trees 1 and 3 remain unchanged. 	 The situation Is shown In figure 6-3. 
Suppose that we now present the instance (d) 	 a positive Instance. 	 Focussing 
falls because the current instance on tree 2 Is above the upper mark, but the 
instance is positive. 	 If the instances were presented in another order, different 
behaviour 	 would 	 be produced, 	 but a 	 similar problem 	 would always 	 occur. For 
example. 	 If 	 the 	 first three 	 Instances were 	 (a) . (b) 	 and 	 (d) . trees 	 2. 	 3 	 and 4 	 all 
become 	 firmed 	 up. Then 	 instance (c) 	 causes the 	 algorithm to 	 fail 	 as 	 It 	 is below 
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1. 	 true(X,Y) (upper) 
action(X,Y) 	 actor(X,Y) 
(lower) / 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y) 
2. 	 true(X) 
slngular( X) 
	
plural( X) 
(upper 
& lower) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 	 4. 	 true(Y) (upper 
/ 
definite(X) 	 indeflni€e( X) 	 pazt(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) 
Figure 6-3: 	 The Description Space Alter a Negative Instance 
the tower mark on all four trees. 
6.2. Other Causes of Inconsistencies in Focussing 
Unfortunately. 	 it 	 is 	 not just 	 disjunctive 	 concepts 	 that 	 can 	 cause 	 such 
inconsistencies. Each of the other possible causes suggests different ways of 
repairing the situation, contributing to a combinatorial explosion in the learning 
process. 
One obvious cause is noisy data. The positive instance that appears above the 
upper mark, or the negative instance that appears below the lower mark may just be 
wrongly classified. The solution in this case is just to ignore the evidence, and 
continue. Possibly, the noisy data occurred earlier in the learning process, in 
which case the solution is to back up and ignore the earlier evidence. 
A 	 cause we have 	 already met 	 (see section 4.2. 1) is 	 a 	 wrong 	 choice 	 of 
discriminant when discriminating against 	 a far 	 miss . 	 The solution 	 in 	 this 	 case 	 is 
to 	 back up to the choice 	 point and choose another grey tree as 	 discriminant. 
An inconsistency can also be caused by an inadequate description space . 	 For 
instance, suppose the correct form of the rule is: 
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describe(X) action(X. Y) & (present(Y) v future(Y)1 
-> use-present(X) 
Since the tense tree is ternary (see figure 6-4) then positive instances for 'present' 
and 'future' will cause Generalization to move the lower bound to the root node. 
tnie(Y) (new lower) 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(current) 	 (old lower) 
	
Figure 6-4: 
	 The Tense Tree Before Manipulation 
A negative instance for 'past' will now be below the lower bound and hence cause 
an inconsistency. The solution In this case is to manipulate the tense tree into the 
form given in figure 6-5. 
true(Y) (upper) 
/ 
past(Y) 	 not-past(Y) (new lower) 
(current) 
present( Y) future( Y) 
(current) 	 (old lower) 
	
Figure 6-5: 
	 The Tense Tree After Manipulation 
We have developed a technique to do this which we call Tree Hacking 
	 It can be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) Mark each tip that has been specified by a positive training instance with 
a +. If the tree has ever been used as a discriminant for a negative 
training Instance, then mark the tip specified with a -. 
	 (NB these 
marks will be inherently contradictory. ) 
	 Mark any unmarked nodes either 
+ or -. nondeterministicaily. 
(b) Remove from the tree all arcs and all nodes except the root and tip 
nodes. 
(c) if there Is only one + node, 
	 then join this to the root node. 
Otherwise, create a new node named P. say, and join It to the root 
and all + nodes to it. 
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(d) If there is only one - node, 	 then join this to the root node. 
Otherwise, create a new node named N, say, and join It to the root 
and all - nodes to It. 
This procedure is correct, but might be improved by making It preserve any of the - 
existing structure of the tree which does not need to be altered. 
The description space may also be inadequate because a relation is missing. For 
Instance, suppose the tense tree is missing, but a positive and negative instance 
differ 	 only 	 in 	 the 	 specification of 	 present(Y) 	 In 	 the 	 positive Instance and 	 past(Y) 	 in 
the 	 negative 	 instance. 	 The 	 two instances 	 will 	 specify 	 identical 	 marks In 	 the 	 relation 
trees, 	 and 	 thus 	 are 	 bound 	 to cause 	 an 	 inconsistency. 	 The solution in 	 this 	 case 	 is 
to 	 create 	 a 	 new 	 relation 	 tree, but we 	 know of no technique for doing this. 
Note 	 that 	 each 	 of 	 these possible 	 causes 	 of 	 what might 	 be 	 identical 	 looking 
inconsistencies, suggests 	 a different 	 solution. 	 Thus an 	 inconsistency 	 causes 	 a 
choice 	 point 	 in the 	 learning process, 	 leading 	 to 	 search and 	 a 	 possible 	 combinatorial 
explosion. 	 In the 	 rest 	 of this 	 section 	 we 	 will 	 assume that 	 inconsistencies 	 are 
caused only by disjunctive rules. 
Note that the detection of inconsistencies is only possible when the learning 
technique combines Generalization and Discrimination, and not when one of these 
techniques Is used on its own. Since Langley used Discrimination without 
Generalization, his program had to adopt a different method of creating disjunctive 
rules. 
6.3. Shell Creation: The Disjunctive Technique of Mitcheii et al 
To cope with inconsistencies caused by disjunctive rules it is necessary to 
introduce a new rule shell and to divide the positive instances between the old and 
the new sheiis. Negative instances should apply to both shells. Both rule shells 
have the same basis. e.g. 	 prefix(X, a). but will firm up to different hypotheses. 
e. g. 
	
present(X) and future(X). 	 Mitchell et al, (151, have implemented a technique 
for 	 doing 	 this 	 for 	 version spaces, 	 which can 	 be 	 easily 	 adapted to 	 Focussing. 	 We 
call 	 it 	 Shell 	 Creation 	 . However, 	 it seems to suffer from some serious 	 flaws. 	 We 
describe 	 Shell 	 Creation 	 in this 	 section 	 and discuss 	 its 	 flaws. 
LEX detects an 	 inconsistency by 	 the occurrence 	 of 	 a 	 positive 	 instance that 	 is 
excluded by 	 the version 	 space 	
. In Focussing, 	 this 	 corresponds 	 to 	 a positive 
Instance above one 	 of 	 the 	 upper mark, as 	 Illustrated 	 above. 	 The 	 other possible 
inconsistency illustrated above, a negative instance that is included by the version 
space. cannot be dealt with by introducing a new rule shell. This Is because 
negative instances apply to both rule shells, and the offending negative Instance will 
continue to cause an inconsistency in the old shell. 
Mitchell at at assume that such inconsistencies are caused by a disjunctive 
concept, rather than: poor choices during far miss Discrimination, noisy data or an 
Inadequate description space. 
Shell 	 Creation creates 	 a new 	 rule shell, represented by 	 a new 	 version space, 
that 	 accounts 	 for the 	 positive instance. The S 	 set 	 of the new vesion 	 space is 	 the 
positive training 	 Instance. The 	 description 	 given doesn't 	 tell us 	 what 	 the 	 G set 
should be. 	 If 	 we adopt 	 the 	 procedure 	 used 	 by Mitchell 	 at al 	 for 	 creating new 
rules. (see 	 section 5). 	 0 	 Is the 	 most 	 gene'rai 	 set. Note that the 	 0 	 set of the old 
version space can't be 	 used, as 	 the 	 current 	 positive training 	 instance 	 lies 	 above it. 
In Focussing this means that the offending positive training Instance Is used to 
set the lower marks of the new rule shell, and the upper marks are set to be the 
roots of the trees. 
How are the subsequent positive instances divided between the old and new rule 
shells? 
Mitchell at al write: 
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"This new heuristic [rule] will be updated by all subsequent negative 
instances associated with operator 0. and by any subsequent positive 
instances associated with operator 0 and to which at least some member of 
Its version space applies." 
By "operator 0", they mean the shared conclusion of the two rule shells. 
Note that the new shell gets preferential treatment when it comes to allocating 
the new positive Instances between 	 the 	 shells, whereas the old shell 	 gets preferential 
treatment when it 	 comes to 	 allocating 	 the old 	 positive instances. Negative 
instances, of course, apply to both shells. 
Even If LEX does eventually learn the disjunctive rule, which Is by no means 
certain, using Shell Creation can cause errors during training. This Is because the 
upper marks of the new rule shell might allow previous negative instances, so the 
ruse might be used in a situation that is already known to be a negative training 
instancel However, this is not the major flaw. 
There are several related major flaws with Shell Creation 
1. The old rule shell may contain a mixture of positive Instances, relating 
to both rules. 	 When the new rule shell is formed it will be missing 
some of these positive instances, and Version Spaces will under-
generalize. 	 Hence, some of the trees may never be firmed up. 
2. The Inclusion In the old rule shell of positive instances properly 
belonging to the new shell will cause Version Spaces to over-generalize 
the old shell. 	 This will cause inconsistencies of the kind not mentioned 
by Mitchell at al: negative instances will be accepted by the version 
space 
3. The new rule shell may be credited with positive instances which should 
have been credited to the old rule shell. This will cause the old shell to 
be undergeneralized and the new shell to be over-generalized. 
We will demonstrate the problems by adapting Shell Creation to Focussing 
Shell Creation is very sensitive to the training order. 	 if, 	 in our running 
example, the instances are presented in the order (a). (b) . (c) 	 (d) . (e). (t). 
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then it works correctly. 
	 After (a) , (b) and (c) . the situation Is as shown In 
figure 6-3. 
	 Then, just as explained in section 6. 1. an Inconsistency occurs when 
positive Instance (d) is presented - the current mark is already excluded by the 
upper mark In tree 2. 
Shell 	 Creation now suggests 	 creating 	 a 	 new rule 	 shell, 	 using 	 (d) 	 to 	 determine 
the 	 lower 	 marks, and putting 	 the 	 upper 	 marks on 	 the 	 roots 	 of 	 the 	 relation 	 trees. 
This Is shown 	 In figure. 6-6. 
	
1. 	 tnie(X,Y) (upper) 
/N 
actlon(x,Y) 
agent(X,Y) 	 objec€(X,y) 
(lower) 
	
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
deflnite(x) indeflnjte(x) 
(lower) 
2. 	 truupper) 
singular(X) 	 plural(X) 
(lower) 
4. 	 tnae(Y) (upper) 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
(lower) 
Figure 6-6: 
	 The New Description Space Following Inconsistency Detection 
The instances 	 (e) and 	 Cf) 	 are 	 now 	 presented 	 to this 	 rule 	 shell. 	 These 	 firm up 
trees 1. 	 2 	 and 	 4. if 	 the 	 negative 	 instance 	 (c) were 	 now 	 presented 	 to 	 the new 
shell, then 	 tree 	 3 would 	 also 	 be 	 firmed 	 up 	 and the 	 new 	 rule 	 shell 	 describes the 
rule: 
cfescrlbe(X) & actor(X,Y) & definite(X) -> use-actlon(x) 
However. Shell Creation does not 	 provide for the re-presentation of negative 
Instances. U) should also 	 be presented 	 to the old shell, 	 as 	 It 	 Is a negative 
instance, and 	 such 	 iUstances are negative 	 for 	 all 	 shells. 	 Also. 	 (e) 	 should 	 be 	 re- 
presented to 	 the 	 old 	 shell, as It 	 is 	 a 	 positive 	 instance 	 relevant 	 to 	 both 	 shells. 
However, Shell Creation does not provide 	 for 	 either. 
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The new shell 	 is 	 not 	 created at 	 all 	 If the 	 instances 	 are presented 	 In the 	 order 
(a). 	 W. (d). 	 (c). 	 (e) . 	 Ct). with 	 the positive 	 instance (d) 	 before 	 the negative 
one 	 (c). After 	 the 	 first 	 two instances the 	 situation 	 is that 	 shown in 	 figure 
6-2 above. 	 The next positive instance. (d). causes Generalization to produce the 
situation shown In figure 6-7. 
1. 	 tnie(X,Y) (upper) 
/ 
action( X,Y) 	 actor(X,Y) 
(lower) 
agent(X,Y) 	 object(X,Y) 
3. 	 tnae(X) (upper 
lower) 
defiñite(X) indefinite(X) 
2. 	 tru (X) (upper 
/ '~~ r) 
eingular(X) 	 plural(X) 
4. 	 true(Y) (upper 
past(Y) present(Y) future(Y) 
- 	 Figure 6-7: 	 The New Description Space After Three Positive Instances 
Trees 2. 3 and 4 are all firmed up at the true root. 	 The next negative 
Instance 	 (c) 	 would cause the lower and upper marks to 	 cross. 	 In Version Spaces. 
this 	 corresponds 	 to members of 	 the S set becoming more general than members of 
the 	 G 	 set. As explained 	 above, this 	 kind 	 of 	 inconsistency 	 cannot 	 be 	 dealt 	 with 	 by 
creating 	 a new rule 	 shell. 
Note that there was no opportunity to 	 take 	 a copy 	 of the 	 description space to 
produce a second rule. The 	 two kinds 	 of positive instances, 	 those due to 
slnguiarCX) 	 and those due 	 to 	 definite(X) . 	 are 	 both 	 mixed in 	 the 	 one 	 rule 	 shell. 	 if 
we 	 consider that the first 	 copy 	 of 	 the 	 space 	 should 	 learn the 	 slngular(X) 	 part, 	 the 
positive 	 instance (d) due 	 to 	 the 	 presence 	 of 	 definite(X) 	 can 	 be 	 considered 	 ialse. 
The lower marks are raised 	 incorrectly 	 in 	 order to 	 include this 	 false 	 instance. 
Negative Instances are not such a problem, because they are negative Instances 
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for all rule shells. 
	 However. in Shell Creation the negative instances which are 
gIven before the creation of the new rule shell do not get an opportunity to 
Influence it. 
	 To overcome this problem, all old negative Instances should be kept, 
and all new copies of the rule shell should be updated with them. 
	 This Is not 
enough, however. 	 All the positive instances have to be kept as well! 
When the a 	 new rule 	 shell is 	 formed the 	 false positive instances should 	 be 
removed from the 	 old shell. There 	 is 	 no simple way 	 to do 	 thIs. A 	 flawless 
solution requires that all instances both positive and negative, are stored. 
	 We 
outline such an extension to Focussing below, which we will call Refocussing 
The first time an inconsistency is detected: 
- a copy of the rule shell must be made, and the Focussing process must 
be restarted using the negative instances on both shells and the posItive 
instances on only one sheil. 
- On each iteration of generalization, the positive instance should be 
allocated to a shell so as to avoid an inconsistency. If possible. 
- Choice points must be saved for subsequent back-up, and back-up to re-
allocate the positive instances should be the first option if subsequent 
inconsistencies are detected. 
- Failing this, a further subdivision of the rule shell can be made, and the 
Focussing process restarted again. 
This process seems very inefficient, but something like it appears to be a 
requirement for all systems that learn disjunctive concepts. 12 
 See sections 6.5 and 
6. 7 for further discussion. 
In conclusion. Mitchell et al have described how Version Spaces can be modified 
12Rofocusslng Is somewhat similar to another technique of M'tchell, described In (11], and Iba, [6], placed in 
a focussing context. Like Refocussing, the methods are computationally expensive, and require that all data must 
be kept. 
r 
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to learn disjunctive concepts using Shell Creation. 	 We have shOwn how Focussing 
can be similarly adapted. 	 However, these solutionC are far from perfect. and rely 
on very favourable training orders. 	 It appears that any adaptation of Focussing to 
learn disjunctive concepts correctly. e.g. 
	
Refocussing above, must Include storage 
of all the training Instances. 
6.4. Shell Forking: The Disjunctive Technique of Langley and Brazdil 
If the rule being learned is disjunctive then certain training orders of the 
instances can cause a far miss to occur. Langley's and Brazdil's method of dealing 
with far misses will then create a disjunctive rule. We call this technique Shell 
Forking . To force such a far miss a positive instance must be given which is true 
for both disjuncts. followed by a negative instance. Langley's version of Shell Forking 
will then make two copies of the rule shell, and Brazdil's version will put a disjunct 
in the hypothesis. However, the technique is very training order dependent. if a 
positive instance is given which is true in only one disjunct. then the far miss will 
never occur. In addition, all the caveats given in the last section about the proper 
division of the positive instances between rule shells, also apply here. 
We can illustrate Shell Forking using our running example. 	 A favourable training 
order is (e) followed by (c) . 	 Figure 6-8 shows the situation after positive instance 
(e). Presenting the negative instance (c) produces a far miss . Discrimination 
can be applied in three ways. as shown be the new upper marks in the figure. 
Trees 1. 2 and 3 are grey. In Langley's formulation of Discrimination this suggests 
division of the existing rule shell into three shells, corresponding to the rules: 
(I) describe(X) & object(X,Y) -) uso-article(X) 
(ii) describo(X) & singular(X) -> uso-article(X) 
(iii) describe(X) & definite(X) -) use-article(X) 
Two of these. (ii) and (iii), are the representation of the disjunctive rule that 
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1. 	 tj)(uper) 
action( X,Y) 	 actcg()C,Y) 
agent( X, Y) 	 object( X, Y) 
(current) 	 (lower & 
new upper 
for rule (1)) 
3. 	 true(X) (upper) 
/ 
definite(X) 	 lndefinite(X) 
(lower 	 (current) 
& new upper 
for rule (iii)) 
2. 	 true(X) (upper) 
/ 
slngular( X) 	 plural( X) 
(lower & 	 (current) 
new upper 
for rule (ii)) 
4. 
11~!7 ) <(Up 
past(Y) pres nt(Y) future(Y) 
(lower 
& current) 
Figure 6-8: 	 Far Misses indIcate Some Possible Disjunctive Rules 
we 	 want. The remaining 	 rule. (I), 	 is 	 wrong. 	 In the shell 	 corresponding to 	 this 
rule. 	 tree 1 	 has firmed 	 up 	 at object(X. V). 	 instead of 	 at actor(X. fl. 	 This rule 	 is 
an accident, which may or may not be downgraded by receiving a low numeric 
score. 
in Langley's program, these three rules will be thrown Into the p001 where their 
numerical 	 strength 	 will 	 be 	 determined 	 by their 	 subsequent 	 success In 	 prediction. 
This 	 is also 	 dependent 	 on 	 training 	 order. If 	 a 	 large 	 sequence 	 of 	 plural. 	 definite. 
object. Instances 	 Is 	 given 	 then 	 the 	 singular rule 	 will 	 be 	 discriminated against. 	 if 	 a 
large 	 sequence 	 of 	 singular. 	 definite, 	 agent. instances 	 is 	 given, 	 then the 	 object 	 rule 
will 	 be dIscriminated 	 against. 	 We 	 want 	 the latter 	 to 	 happen 	 and 	 the former 	 not 	 to 
happen, but there is no way of guaranteeing this. 
Langley's program doesn't have to keep all the data. However, it does keep all 
the rules! The possible haphazard nature of the learning process might be avoided 
If all the data was preserved, with some modIfIcatIon of the rule-ordering technique 
that takes into account the proportion of data explained. 
Although Brazdll's technique creates disjunctIve rules to deal with far misses (as 
52 
explained In section 4.2. 1) . this is only a temporary expedient. 
	 The technique is 
based on the assumption that the rule is really conjunctive, and, at the first 
opportunity. all but one of the disjuncts is pruned. 
	 Thus Brazdll's program does not 
really 	 learn 	 disjunctive 	 concepts. It 	 is 	 possible 	 that the program could 	 be 	 adapted 
to 	 learn 	 disjunctive 	 concepts. 	 but It 	 might then 	 suffer on conjunctive concepts. 
6. 5. Classification 
None of the programs discussed above can deal flawlessly with disjunctive 
concepts. 	 However, there are concept learning programs which can do so, for 
instance. lD3. (171 and lba's program. (6). 
	
In this section we describe Quinlan's 
103, and in the next section contrast it with Focussing. 
103 can be fitted into the Focussing framework when it is working on conjunctive 
concepts. However, 	 to 	 discuss disjunction, we must depart 	 from 	 this 	 framework, 
and 	 describe the technique 	 used by 	 IDa, 	 which we will call 	 Classification 
Classification 	 differs from Focussing 	 In many 	 Important 	 respects. 	 Firstly. 	 It 	 tests 
each 	 relation 	 in 	 turn on 	 all the 	 training instances, 	 whereas Focussing 	 tests 	 each 
instance 	 in 	 turn, 	 on all 	 the relations. Classification 	 keeps all 	 its 	 data, 	 whereas 
Focussing 	 does not. 	 Keeping all 	 the data 	 seems 	 to 	 be 	 a 	 necessary feature 	 of a 
flawless 	 learning technique 	 for disjunctive concepts. 
Classification represents its concept via a decision tree . 
	 Each node of this tree 
is 	 labelled 	 by 	 an 	 attribute 	 , and 	 the 	 branches below this 	 are 	 labelled by 	 the 
different 	 possible 	 values 	 of this 	 attribute 	 (see figure 6-9) . 	 An 	 attribute in 
Classification 	 corresponds 	 to 	 a Focussing 	 relation 	 tree of depth 	 one. 	 Each value 	 of 
the 	 attribute 	 corresponds 	 to 	 a branch 	 of the 	 relation tree. For 	 instance, 	 the attribute 
'tense' might take values: 	 past, present and 	 future, 	 which 	 corresponds 	 to 	 the 	 tense 
relation tree (see figure 	 6-4). 
The decision tree is a representation of the partially learned concept. 
	
The tree 
I 
53 
is initially empty. and Classification grows the tree. 	 This involves the following 
stops: 
(a) 	 if 	 all 	 the 	 instances In 	 the set 	 are positive, 	 then 	 a 	 node 	 Is 	 created 
marked 	 as 	 being 	 within 	 the concept. if 	 they 	 are 	 all 	 negative, 	 then 	 a 
node is created and marked as 	 being outside 	 the 	 concept. 	 if there 	 are 
no 	 instances 	 in 	 the set then a node is 	 created 	 and 	 marked 	 arbitrarily 	 as 
within 	 or 	 outside 	 the concept. 	 In 	 any of these 	 cases 	 the 	 process 	 then 
halts. 
(b) Otherwise, an attribute is chosen In a heuristic manner. 	 (Quinlan uses 
an information theoretic method.) A new decision node is created. 	 The 
node Is marked with the name of the attribute, and has a daughter node 
for each of the possibie values that the attribute can take. 
(c) The training Instances are partitioned into subsets according to the 
values of the attribute. 	 For attribute A. we call this step splitting on 
A. 
(d) The process is applied recursively to each of the subsets. 
6.6. How Classification Handles Disjunction 
We now show how Quinian's program is able to learn disjunctive rules. 	 Consider 
the 	 problem defined 	 by instances given in figure 	 6-1 	 above 	 using 	 the 	 attributes 
adapted from the 	 relation trees 	 in figure 4-1. 
Each of the relation trees in figure 4-1 will give rise to an attribute . 	 Tree 2 
gives an attribute number(X) . with values: 	 singuiar(X) or plural(X) . 	 Tree 3 gives 
the attribute deflniteness(X) with values: 	 definite(X) and indefinite(X) . 	 Tree 4 
gives the attribute tense(Y) with values: 	 past(Y) 	 presont(Y) and future(Y) . 	 Tree 
1 must first be flattened to a tree of depth 1, and then gives an attribute 
case(X. Y) . with values: 	 action(X. N') 	 agent(X. N') and object(X. N') . 	 Note that this 
process destroys the structure of tree 1. 	 - 
If Classification first splits on the number attribute, the singular subset contains 
only positive instances, so this branch is compiete. 	 The plural subset contains both 
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typos 	 of 	 instances, 	 and more Classification needs 	 to be 	 done. Splitting on the 
definite/indefinite 	 attribute then completes 	 the process, forming 	 the decision tree in 
figure 6-9. 
root 
	
definite( )C) 
	 lndefinite( X) 
/\ 
action(X,Y) agent(X,Y) 
	 object(X,Y) 	 singular(X,Y) plural(X,Y) 
(e) -ve 	 () 	 (d, f) +ve 	 (a, b) +ve 	 (c) -ye 
	
Figure 6-9: 
	 A Decision Tree 
The tip nodes are labelled with the sot of instances that they represent, and whether 
the instances are positive or negative. 
	 This tree represents the rule 
descnibe(X) & 
f(defiriiteCX) & object(x)) v (indefinite(X) & singular(X))) 
-) use-articie(X) 	 (v) 
The rule (v) is not quite the one we intended to learn, although it will always give 
the correct results. There Is no splitting order which will give us the form of rule 
we intended. The reason is: 
1. That some of the logical properties represented in the case relation tree 
were lost when it was flattened to depth one. 
2. That Classification is sometimes forced to include irrelevant attributes on 
one branch in order that they can appear on another branch, e. g. the 
number attribute above. 
However, a 	 poor 	 splitting 	 heuristic 	 can make 	 the 	 problem 	 much 	 worse. For 
example, if 	 the 	 tense 	 attribute 	 had 	 been chosen 	 first, 	 then 	 the 	 hypothesis of 	 rule 
(v) 	 would 	 be 	 duplicated 	 as 	 two 	 disjuncts: one 	 headed 	 by 	 present(X) 	 and one 	 by 
past(X) . which 	 is 	 completely 	 redundant. Quinlan's 	 information 	 theoretic splitting 
heuristic is 	 quite 	 good 	 at 	 avoiding 	 such redundancy 	 where 	 possible. 	 but 	 it is 	 not 
perfect. 
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6. 7. A Comparison of Focussing and Classification 	
* 
in this section we compare the performance of Focussing and Classification on 
conjunctive and disjunctive concepts. 
Because it uses both Generalization and Discrimination. Focussing is able to 
detect that a rule has been completely learned, because all the trees are firmed 
up. Classification cannot guarantee its output in this way. Further training 
Instances might always cause Classification to refine the rule further, splitting on a 
tip node which previously only contained instances of one type, but now contains 
mixed instances. 
Another drawback of Classification is that the decision trees It produces are often 
non-optimal. 	 Classification will usually produce a disjunctive rule, even when 
Fodusslng would produce a conjunctive rule on the same data. 	 The Classification 
decision tree will often contain attributes that are irrelevant to the concept being 
learned. Quinlan's use of an information theoretic technique to choose which 
attribute to split on, tends to keep down the number of irrelevant attributes in the 
decision tree, but It Is not perfect and does not exclude them all. As we have 
seen, even an optimal splitting order does not produce an optimal rule hypothesis. 
Classification 	 needs 	 to 	 have 	 access 	 to 	 all 	 the 	 training instances 	 before it 	 can 
learn 	 the concept. 	 Focussing 	 incorporates 	 all 	 the 	 information, contained 	 in 	 a training 
instance, into 	 the 	 current 	 rule 	 shell, 	 and 	 then 	 discards 	 it. Not only does 	 this 	 save 
storage 	 space. 	 but 	 it 	 means 	 that 	 it 	 can 	 use 	 the 	 partially 	 learned rule 	 before all 	 the 
instances have 	 been 	 provided. 	 However, 	 the 	 discussion above 	 suggests that 	 in 
• 	 order 	 to learn 	 disjunctive 	 concepts. 	 Focussing, 	 or 	 any other 	 concept learning 
technique, would 	 have 	 to 	 retain 	 all 	 the 	 instances, 	 and might 	 have 	 to rebuild 
structure. 
Classification, as we have described it above, does not need to rebuild structure. 
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Quinian describes In (171 how Classification can be adapted to learn where It only 
has access to part of the data at any time. 	 in this case, the decision tree must 
be rebuilt when necessary. 	 iba. [61, describes a program that can learn disjunctive 
concepts. 	 Iba's program also spends much of the time rebuilding structures, and It 
keeps all its training instances for this purpose. 
Against these disadvantages. Classification is able to learn disjunctive rules and to 
avoid having to confront far misses. 	 It is best for Focussing to generalize from all 
the positive instances before discriminating from any negative instances. 
Classification is not affected by the training order of instances, although the 
simplicity of its final decision tree is dependent on the order in which it splits on 
p 
attributes. 	 Further, while ordering positive before negative instances may enable 
Focussing to avoid far misses, it makes it more susceptible to errors when using 
Shell Creation to learn disjunctive concepts. 
The comparison of Classification with Focussing shows that while Classification can 
learn both conjunctive and disjunctive concepts. the standard Focussing algorithm can 
only learn conjunctive concepts. 
	 On conjunctive concepts. however, Focussing has 
several advantages, 	 seen above, the rules produced by Focussing can be much 
simpler than the decision trees formed by Classification. 	 Also. Focussing can delete 
data once it has been used. Classification cannot do this. 
More details of the comparison between Classification and Focussing can be found 
in [161. 
7. Conclusion 
in this paper we have compared a collection of Al rule learning programs. 
Despite apparent differences of notation and terminology these programs are tackling 
similar problems in similar ways. Each of the programs consist of two main parts: 
a critic for identifying faults; and a modifier for correcting faults. 
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This analytic comparison set out to: abstract some rule learning techniques from 
the programs they were developed in; to identify their range: to locate and repair 
their flaws: to establish the relationship between them; and to extend their range. 
in this final section we summarise what we have achieved. 
7. 1. Techniques Abstracted 
In this paper we have abstracted the following rule learning techniques. 	 Some of 
them have, of course, been previously abstracted by other authors, but some 
abstractions are original to this paper. 
- Criticism Techniques: Ideal Trace. Solution Extraction and Contradiction 
Backtracing. Contradiction Backtracing is only suitable for finding factual 
faults. Ideal Trace is suitable for both control and factual faults. Solution 
Extraction is a technique for automatically obtaining ideal traces. 
- Conjunctive 	 Modification 	 Techniques: 	 Rule 	 Ordering, 	 instantiation. 
Discrimination. Generalization, Version Spaces and Focussing. 	 Focussing 
and Version Spaces are very similar, and are suitable for both factual 
and control faults. 	 They combine Discrimination and Generalization. 
Discrimination, in turn, subsumes Instantiation. 	 Rule Ordering is only 
suitable for control faults. 
- Disjunctive 	 Modification 	 Techniques: 	 Shell 	 Creation, 	 Shell 	 Forking. 
Refocussing and Classification. Classification is an unflawed disjunctive 
learning technique. Shell Creation is a flawed attempt to modify Version 
Spaces to learn disjunctive rules. Shell Forking is a flawed attempt to 
modify Discrimination. We propose Refocussing as an unfiawed modification 
of Focussing for disjunctive rules. 
- Rule Creation Techniques: 	 Modifying the Empty Rule. Guided Rule 
Creation. 	 Modifying the Empty Rule is an unflawed technique. 	 Guided 
Rule Creation is a potentially unflawed technique. but Waterman's 
implementation may be flawed as he doesn't seem to address the problem 
of rule ordering correctly. 
- Description Space Modification: Tree Hacking is a proposed technique for 
restructuring the Focussing description space in the face of apparently 
contradictory instances. 
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7. 2, Flaws Indentified 
We have Identified a number of flaws in those techniques or In the way they 
have been used in the ,programs we studied. 
- Langley used Rule Ordering for suppressing factual faults. 	 He claims that 
this technique can help cope with noisy data. 
- 	 Mitchell et 	 al 	 kept 	 a 	 set 	 of lower 	 bounds 	 in 	 each version 	 space 
whereas only 	 one 	 lower 	 bound will 	 ever 	 be 	 needed 	 in the 	 situation 	 that 
LEX 	 was dealing 	 with. 	 Mitchell claims 	 that 	 a 	 set 	 of lower 	 bounds 	 is 
required where 	 the 	 relations 	 in a version 	 space form 	 a lattice 	 rather 	 than 
a 	 tree. 
- 130th Mitchell et al's Shell Creation and Langley's. Shell. Forking pe 
dependent on the training order, and can fail If this is unfavourabie. 
7. 3. Discussion 
Solution Extraction and Contradiction Backtracing, are interesting new criticism 
techniques, which are not in widespread use yet. 
Surprisingly, 	 most of the techniques for 	 correcting faults 	 are 	 equally applicable to 
factual 	 and 	 control faults. This 	 is 	 a consequence of 	 the 	 common technique of 
including control information in the rules. as extra conditions or instantiations, as if 
it were factual information. 
If 	 the 	 rules 	 to 	 be 	 learnt 	 are 	 known to 	 be conjunctive. then 	 Focussing 	 and 
Version 	 Spaces 	 are 	 the 	 most 	 powerful 	 modification techniques. Not 	 only 	 do 	 they 
subsume 	 most 	 of 	 the 	 other 	 conjunctive learning techniques. but 	 they 	 produce 	 a 
simpler 	 solution 	 more 	 efficiently 	 than 	 Classification. They do not require 	 instances 	 to 
be 	 stored. 	 Focussing 	 emerges 	 as 	 one of 	 the more 	 powerful 	 techniques 	 of 	 the 
paper, 	 and clearly deserves 	 more attention than 	 it has 	 attracted in 	 the 	 past. 
13 
13This lack of attention Is partly the fault of the Young et al, who have only reported It In a cryptic one page 
paper 
I 
r 
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If the rules may be disjunctive then Olassification . Refocussing or some similar 
•  technique must be used. It will be necessary to store all instances, and either to 
put off learning until all the instance are known or to be prepared to restart the 
learning process when apparently contradictory instances are input. 
All the techniques described in this paper are dependant for their success on the 
user-supplied, description space For instance. if the Focussing description space 
should contain surplus relation trees then the learning process will require extra 
instances and more time, and may get distracted by irrelevant far misses. If vital 
relation trees should be missing or be the wrong shape. then the description space 
will become contradictory and the learning process will fail. Automatic provision or 
modification of the description space is the most urgent open problem facing 
automatic learning. 	 Our new Tree Hacking technique is a small contribution to the 
solution of this problem. 	 Lenat's and Mitchell's recent work also offers an 
interesting approach to the problem. (8. 9. 12, 131. 
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